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THE INCORPORATION OF THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN
PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Landlords often take advantage of low-income tenants by inducing
them, through low rents, to accept substandard housing.1 The Ameri-
can legal system has recently begun to resolve the inequities involved
where public housing tenants pay rent and assume a substantial risk of
loss due to the outrageous disrepair of the housing.2 In support of
more stringent maintenance standards in public housing, one court
noted:
It seems unconscionable to allow a landlord to extract rent when
the shelter paid for is uninhabitable by any decent standards. In
that regard, there is simply no difference in principle when the
landlord is a public agency. The tenant's plight is the same, and
the callous insistence upon continued rent is no less abhorrent.3
This Note will analyze judicial incorporation of the implied war-
ranty of habitability under state law in federal public housing legisla-
tion. Part I focuses on the history and policy of housing legislation.
Part II discusses the implied warranty of habitability under state law,
its policy and alternative remedies that courts have applied. Part III
1. Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 213 (1970).
2. Id. at 207-16. Tenants commonly have poorly functioning refrigerators that
cause food spoilage. Cockroaches, vermin and mice infest these apartments. There are
often structural problems with floors and ceilings. Furthermore, ceilings often are in
poor repair and leak, creating both a safety hazard as well as potential personal prop-
erty damage. Id. See infra note 95 for a description of the condition of property at issue
in Conlle v. Secretary of HUD, 840 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
3. Techer v. Pierce, No. N-78-484, slip op. at 4 (D. Conn. Oct 13, 1982).
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discusses the early cases that considered the incorporation of the im-
plied warranty into federal housing programs. Part IV analyzes the
recent case of Conille v. U. S. Departnent of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment 4 and the guidelines it created for applying the implied war-
ranty of habitability. Finally, in Part V, this Note will suggest a future
approach to protecting low-income tenants.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The two major pieces of legislation providing for the federal housing
program are the National Housing Act (NHA) and the United States
Housing Act (USHA). Although these Acts provide for different pro-
grams, they have the same policy goals. In the National Housing Act
of 1934,' Congress attempted to increase the accessibility of mortgage
credit.6 NHA programs assist in financing low income housing by
guaranteeing mortgages to those who would not ordinarily qualify.' In
1937, Congress enacted the United States Housing Act (USHA).'
Congress developed USHA to correct the "acute shortage of decent,
safe and sanitary" housing for lower income families-a problem exac-
erbated by the Depression.9 The program continues to be a central
feature of the federal public housing program. USHA's main function
is to subsidize the operation of local public housing authorities.'0
Under the USHA, HUD and local housing authorities enter into an
Annual Contributions Contract under which HUD guarantees the pay-
ment of subsidies to house low-income tenants. In return, the agency
4. 840 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
5. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750(W) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING IN THE
SEVENTIES: A REPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY REVIEW 1-8 (1974).
7. Id.
8. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 889 (1937), as amended 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413
(1949), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982). The broad policy goals of the USHA are set out as
follows:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the Nation by
employing its funds and credit.., to assist the several states and their political
subdivisions to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the
acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of low income and
•.. to vest in local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility
in the administration of their housing programs.
Id.
10. Id
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administers the local housing programs. 1
Congress enacted both of these Acts with the overriding national
goal of providing "a decent home and suitable living environment for
every American family."12 However, in 1978 Congress found that this
goal was not met," and considered the shortage of low-income housing
a "matter of grave national concern."14 One of the problems was that
many housing projects had defaulted on federally insured loans forcing
HUD to foreclose on these mortgages. Congress noted that many
projects had deteriorated during the period of HUD ownership, yet
HUD had not responded to the need for adequate maintenance of their
properties. s In response to these shortcomings, Congress enacted the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1978,16 which required
HUD to take affirmative steps to maintain HUD-owned properties in a
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c, 1437d (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1701t provides: "The Congress affirms the national goal, as set forth
in section 1441 of Title 42 of 'a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family.'" 12 U.S.C. § 1701t.
13. S. REP. No. 871, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4773, 4796.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1701t provides:
The Congress finds that this goal has not been fully realized for many of the
nation's lower income families that this is a matter of grave national concern; and
that there exist in the public and private sectors of the economy the resources and
capabilities necessary to the full realization of this goal.
12 U.S.C. § 1701t.
15. Section 209(c) [12 U.S.C. § 1701z-l1c] would require that the Secretary of
[HUD] to maintain all HUD-owned multifamily projects in decent, safe, and sani-
tary condition. The committee has received testimony that many projects have
actually deteriorated during the period of HUD ownership and that HUD has been
unresponsive in many cases to the need for adequate maintenance of HUD-owned
properties.
S. REP. No. 871, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 4773, 4796.
16. Congress drafted the property disposition program to fit within the structure of
the NHA.
(a) The Secretary of [HUD] ... shall manage or dispose of multifamily housing
projects that are owned by the Secretary, in a manner that is consistent with the
National Housing Act and this section.... The purpose of the property manage-
ment and disposition program ... shall be to manage and dispose of projects in a
manner which will protect the financial interests of the federal government and be
less costly to the federal government than other reasonable alternatives by which
the Secretary can further the goals of...
(3) maintaining the existing housing stock in a decent, safe and sanitary
condition.
12 U.S.C. § 1701z-1l(a).
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manner consistent with its statutory purpose of providing safe, decent
and sanitary housing.
The language in the Housing and Community Development Act17
provided for agency discretion18 in determining on a "case by case"
basis that maintenance of a particular property is "clearly inappropri-
ate."' 9 Nevertheless, HUD's regulations indicate that the Secretary
must provide and occupy in a decent, safe, and sanitary fashion as
many units as possible in the most cost efficient manner.20 While the
HUD regulations do not define "decent, safe, and sanitary," the Secre-
tary has provided that HUD must assure compliance with local hous-
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-11(c). These 1978 amendments stated more explicitly the
Secretary's duty to maintain his projects in decent, safe and sanitary condition. The Act
requires:
the Secretary shall
(A) to the greatest extent possible maintain all occupied multi-family housing
projects in a decent, safe and sanitary condition.
(1) In the case of multifamily housing projects.., that are owned by the Secre-
tary (or for which the Secretary is mortgagee in possession).
18. Id. Legislative history draws into question the Congressional intent behind the
words "shall seek." The original Senate bill (Senate bill 3084, reported May 15, 1978)
for what eventually became section 170 1z-1 1(c) required that the Secretary maintain all
occupied multi-family housing projects owned by the Secretary in a decent, safe and
sanitary condition. S. Rep. No. 871, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4773, 4796.
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-1 l(a). In the legislative history of the Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, 94 Stat. 1614 (1980), Congress
repeated its intent for decent, safe and sanitary housing:
The Committee believes that all projects acquired by the Secretary should be cov-
ered by the Section 203 (now 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-l1) management and disposition
program to assure that the projects are properly cared for during HUD ownership,
that they are disposed of in a manner that will promote their use as decent, afforda-
ble rental housing for the current and future tenants, and that the needs of the
tenants are appropriately considered under any management and disposition
decision.
S. REP. No. 736, 96th Cong., 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3506, 3543. See Frisby v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 755 F.2d 1052, 1057 (3d
Cir. 1985) (statute identifies factors which the Secretary must take into account in his
discretion).
20. The Secretary's own regulations require a minimum standard of maintenance.
24 C.F.R. § 290.10(a) (1989) ("maintain occupied housing in decent, safe and sanitary
condition in the most cost efficient manner"). See also 24 C.F.R. § 290.20(a)(2) ("main-
taining existing housing stock in decent, safe and sanitary condition"); 24 C.F.R.
§ 290.16(d) (requires immediate repair when the conditions of leased properties present
threats to health or safety). But see U.S. v. Cacares, 440 U.S. 741, 754 n. 18 (1979)
("agencies are not required, at the risk of invalidation of their action, to follow all of
their rules, even those properly classified as 'internal' ").
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ing codes when maintaining HUD-owned and operated multifamily
properties.2 1
III. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY UNDER STATE LAW
Leases of private property contain an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. Because the policy reasons for its implication in private property is
consistent with the Congress's goals for public housing, courts are now
incorporating the warranty into federal housing statutes.2 2
At common law there was no implied warranty of habitability. The
rule of caveat emptor did not hinder the typical agrarian tenant because
most defects in the property were obvious to the tenant.2 a Moreover,
in an agrarian society, the lease applied to the land itself and not the
building on the premises.24 Unlike the agrarian tenants, the contempo-
rary apartment dwellers depend more on their leases to insure habita-
ble living conditions2 5 than to protect the land beneath their
buildings.26 Instead, contemporary tenants seek heat, hot water, elec-
tricity, plumbing and proper maintenance. In 1970, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, in the landmark case Javins v. First National Realty
Corp,2 7 rejected the common law use of caveat emptor in context of
urban residential leases and provided the tenants with greater protec-
tion.28 To effectuate such a change, the court held that it would inter-
pret leases of urban housing under contract law.29
The D.C. Circuit based its conclusion that the common law rule
21. "HUD has a major responsibility when repairing HUD-owned and operated
multi-family properties to assure compliance with local [housing] codes and standards
... [and the Secretary's] repair program must include those items which will correct or
eliminate code deficiencies." HUD Property Disposition Handbook, ch. 2, para 28 (as
cited in Chase v. Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F. Supp 90, 97 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
22. Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Federal Housing Projects: Alex-
ander v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 19 B.C.L. REv. 343, 352 (1978).
See also Techer v. Roberts-Harris 83 F.R.D. 124, 128 (D. Conn. 1979).
23. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Javins.
24. 428 F.2d at 1074.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See generally
3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY para. 233 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (discuss-
ing habitability in private property).
28. 428 F.2d at 1080.
29. Id. at 1079.
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should be changed on three grounds. First, the court recognized that
urban tenants generally have neither the skill nor equipment to make
necessary repairs.30 The average tenant's short stay in a particular
apartment does not justify his making extensive repairs.31 Second, be-
cause the contemporary landlord-tenant relationship is similar to that
of a buyer and seller of goods, developments in consumer protection
law should extend to landlord-tenant law.32 Third, the housing
shortage and the inequality of bargaining power warrant laws favorable
to tenants. 33 The court further found that the social impact of substan-
dard housing is not only detrimental to those living in the properties
but also to society.34
Javins has significantly changed landlord-tenant law by introducing
the implied warranty of habitability. Under this doctrine the tenant's
obligation to pay rent depends on the landlord's maintenance of the
premises in habitable condition. 35 Usually the local housing codes es-
tablish the maintenance standards.36 Lessors who violate the implied
warranty of habitability are liable for actual and consequential
damages.37
IV. PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF HABITABILITY
Javins' acknowledgement of the importance of decent housing has
prompted courts to consider extending liability for inadequate public
housing to the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). Three theories support a tenant's claim against HUD for sub-
standard housing under the NHA and USHA: implied private right of
action theory, third party beneficiary theory or the state implied war-
ranty of habitability theory.
30. Id. at 1078.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1075.
33. Id. at 1079.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1082.
36. Id.
37. See Roeder v. Nolan, 321 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1982) (incidental and consequential
damages where the implied warranty of habitability was materially breached); Simon v.
Soloman, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (landlord liable for difference between
rent paid and value of property as well as reckless infliction of emotional distress);
Detling v. Edebrock, 671 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1984) (damages for impaired enjoyment of
premises and consequential damages.
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The implied right of action theory3" allows the tenant to attempt to
prove an implied right of action exists in the "decent, safe and sani-
tary" statutory requirement of the USHA.39 However, courts have re-
peatedly noted that neither legislative history nor statutory language
contain evidence of congressional intent to grant or deny tenants an
implied right of action.'
Under the third party beneficiary theory, courts may infer third
38. See generally Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under the United States
Housing Act of 1937, 1987 DuKE L.J. 915; Note, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Cause of
Action and the Ongoing Vitality of Cort v. Ash, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 722 (1985); Com-
ment, No Implied Cause of Action Under the National Housing Act! A Barrier to a
Statutory Right, 22 URB. L. ANN. 249 (1981) (comment published prior to reevaluation
among lower courts concerning existence of an Implied Right of Action under the
USHA).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982). The Supreme Court established, in Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975), a four-part test: 1) is the plaintiff one of the class for whose benefit the
statute was enacted; 2) is there any indication of legislative intent either to create such a
remedy or deny one; 3) is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
theme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff; 4) is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law in an area basically the concern of the states so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. 422 U.S. at 80-84.
See generally Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under the United States Housing
Act of 1937, 1987 DuKE L.J. 915 (argues that despite the Supreme Court's recent reluc-
tance to imply a private right of action where Congress has not directly provided for
one, the federal courts should permit the prosecution of private claims under the
USHA's "decent, safe, and sanitary" statutory requirement).
Those courts that have found the private right of action are: Wright v. City of Roa-
noke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (Supreme Court recognized a section
1983 privacy remedy for an alleged violation of the USHA and indicated that plaintiffs
may seek redress under private right of action); Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 711 (6th
Cir. 1984) (legislative silence supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
deny beneficiaries of Brooke Amendment a private cause of action); Silva v. East Provi-
dence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 464-65 (D.R.I. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 565
F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1977) (allowing prospective tenants of lower rent housing to bring
action against HUD for terminating a building contract).
40. Phelps v. Hous. Auth., 742 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1984) (refused to imply a private
right of action); Perry v. Hous. Auth., 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Greater
Gadsden Hous. Auth., 802 F.2d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1986) (tenants in public housing
have no implied right of action to enforce rent provisions of Brooke Amendment);
Brown v. Hous. Auth., 784 F.2d 1533, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1986) (following 4th Circuit's
application of Cort factors in Perry); Stone v. District of Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 976,
978-80 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding no strong evidence of Congressional intent to create a
private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)); McGhee v. Hous. Auth., 543 F.
Supp. 607, 608-10 (M.D. Ala. 1982). Some courts have held that congressional silence
regarding their intent to grant tenants a right of action indicates that there is no implied
right. Other courts, however, have held that silence merely requires further analysis
under the Cort test.
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party beneficiary status from contracts with local public housing au-
thorities and private landlords to provide housing for low income fami-
lies.4 Tenants use this theory to claim that the legislative mandate
"shall" directs the landlord to provide decent, safe and sanitary hous-
ing under the USHA.42 Neither the implied right of action theory nor
the third party beneficiary theory has proven as effective as the incor-
poration of the implied warranty of habitability into the NHA in pro-
tecting public housing tenants' interests. Thorough discussion of the
41. Whereas an implied right of action involves the consideration of Congressional
intent, third party beneficiary analysis involves the intent of the parties to the contract.
Courts have implied third party beneficiary status in the contracts between HUD and
local housing authorities and private landlords providing for subsidized housing
through the use of the legislative mandate "shall" in directing the landlord to provide
"decent, safe and sanitary" housing. Courts see this as evidence of Congress's intent to
give tenants the benefit of the contract. See Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied
right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875
(1985) (argues that some courts incorrectly fail to make the distinction between third
party beneficiary and implied cause of action analysis). See generally 2 S. WILLISTON,
WILLISTON CONTRACTS § 356 A (1959) ("It is the intent or purpose of the promisee
who pays for the promise that has generally been looked upon as governing"); Recent
Development, Third Party Beneficiary Analysis in Federal Housing Law: In Search of
Uniformity, 35 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. LAW 203 (1989); Note, Third Party
Beneficiary and Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 880 (1982);
Note, Third Party Beneficiary and the Intention Standard: A Search for Rational Con-
tract Decision-making, 54 VA. L. REv. 1166 (1968).
42. Many courts have not extended third party beneficiary theory for public hous-
ing tenants. See Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 201 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (indicated in a footnote that extending third party beneficiary theory for discrete
violations of maintaining "decent safe and sanitary" dwellings would be inconsistent
with the federal housing law); Edwards v. District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 329 (D.
Kan. 1985) (court rejected the claim that the landlord who allowed the project to fall
into a state of disrepair had constructively demolished it without fulfilling statutory
prerequisites to demolition); Perry v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Charleston, 664 F.2d
1210 (4th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs were not third party beneficiaries in an Annual Contri-
butions Contract between HUD and the Local Housing Authority).
However, some courts have found third-party beneficiary status for claimants under
the Housing Act. See Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981) (tenants have
third party beneficiary status to bring claim regarding an owner's improper certilcation
of tenants which resulted in delayed payments). These decisions tend to be claims re-
garding compliance with the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act and other express provi-
sions. See Ashton v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 56, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 70
(D.C.CIr. 1983) (tenants as third party beneficiaries of an Annual Contributions Con-
tract between HUD and the local housing authority could enforce Lead-based Paint
Poisoning Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4822 (1982), against HUD); Knox Hill Tenant Council v.
Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (tenants could sue as a third
party beneficiary).
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implied right of action and third party beneficiary theories is beyond
the scope of this Note.
When HUD owns low-income housing, plaintiffs may claim that the
state implied warranty of habitability is incorporated into the federal
housing law.4 3 Courts are finding that HUD properties are not like
other federal properties, which are "enclaves exempt from local law."'
Although the federal housing program4 5 does not expressly provide for
the incorporation of an implied warranty of habitability in public hous-
ing, courts have recently extended the state law warranty into the
NHA.4 6 Most of these decisions, however, have declined to incorpo-
rate state law in its entirety.
A. Federal Common Law: Analytical Framework4 7
Federal courts develop federal common law to fill the gaps48 that
43. See infra note 82 for a list of courts that have incorporated an implied warranty
of habitability in public housing legislation.
44. Burroughs v. Hills, 741 F.2d 1525, 1528 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1009 (1985). See also Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1055
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (no evidence of Congressional intent to exempt government-owned
housing from local codes); City Wide Coalition v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 356 F.
Supp. 123, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (Congress did not grant HUD right to preempt local
health regulations in HUD acquired properties); City of Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F.
Supp. 148, 153 (E.D. Pa 1973) (HUD liable to purchasers for property conditions which
violate local ordinance).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1989). See infra note 108 for the statutory language.
46. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
47. Prior to deciding on the merits whether an implied warranty is incorporated
into federal law, the court must establish that the Secretary of HUD waived sovereign
immunity barring suit. The NHA authorizes the Secretary of HUD to "sue and be
sued" in administering the NHA. 12 U.S.C. § 1702. See Federal Hous. Admin. v.
Burr. 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) (Supreme Court held that "sue and be sued" should be
construed liberally, but the Court noted that § 1702 did not explicitly waive immunity
where waiver would be clearly inconsistent with the goals of the NHA); Industrial
Indemnity, Inc. v. Landrieu, 615 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1980) (payment for construction
work insured by the Secretary in an NHA authorized program satisfies the criteria from
Burr that the Secretary must be carrying out the provisions of the Act and thus the
Secretary waives sovereign immunity); Merrill Tenant Council v. U.S. Dep't of Hous.
and Urban Dev., 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1981) (suit for payment of interest on tenant
security deposits, based on the theory that an Illinois statute incorporated as an implied
term in the tenants' leases with HUD requiring such interest payments, was within the
limiting language of the statute).
48. When Congress does not provide the rule of decision, courts may infer that
Congress intended state law to fill in the gaps unless the law conflicts with federal inter-
ests at issue. See Wallis v. Pan Am Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); U.S. v.
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Congress4 9 has left in the federal statutory scheme.5 ° Once the court
decide to develop federal common law,51 it has two options in fashion-
ing its rule: formulate independent federal common law52 or adopt
state law as the federal rule of decision. 3 In analyzing which rule to
apply, a court must decide whether adopting state law will conflict
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112,
1116 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1981).
49. The issue of the landlord's obligation to its tenants does not present a situation
where Congress has comprehensively occupied a field and thereby displaced a federal
rule. Cf. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-32 (1981) (Clean Water Act precludes
federal common law public nuisance action for interstate water pollution because it
comprehensively addresses federal water pollution and provides remedial scheme for
statutory violations). Federal law is essentially incomplete and interstitial and often
depends on state law to fill gaps. "Congress acts... against the background of state law
in much the same way a state legislature acts against the background of common law."
Note, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 525
(1954).
50. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), is the starting point
in recent federal common law analysis. In Clearfield, the United States brought an
action against the defendant for clearing a check issued by the government which had
been fraudulently endorsed. Id. at 365. Under state law, the United States would have
been barred from recovery. Id at 366. Because there was a gap in federal law the
Court was free to fashion a federal common law rule. Id. at 367. The Court found that
when Congress has not specified a rule, under federal common law federal courts must
choose between adopting state law as the federal rule of decision or fashioning an in-
dependent federal common law rule. Id. The Court held that the interstitial applica-
tion of state law in this case would subject the federal interests to uncertainty. Id.
51. Federal courts have continued to apply federal law in construing leases in which
the United States is a party. See, eg., Texas Industries Inc. v. Radclifi Materials Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981); U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land Co. Inc., 412 U.S. 580 (1973);
Krupp v. Fed. Hous. Admin., 285 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1961).
52. The Supreme Court has developed federal common law only in a "few and re-
stricted" circumstances. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 681 (1963). "[When
Congress has not spoken to a particular issue.., and when there exists a 'significant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.'" Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
53. The Third Circuit clarified when the court may incorporate state law as a mat-
ter of federal common law in Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 872 (3d Cir.
1945). In Girard Trust, the court held that leases with the federal government are to be
construed like government contracts according to uniform independent federal common
law. Id. at 874. The court noted the exception that state law applies as a matter of
federal common law when the contract defines a relationship to real property since real
property is peculiarly the province of state regulation. Id. at 874. The implied warranty
of habitability does not define a relation to real property within the exception of Girard
Trust.
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with the federal program or federal interest at stake.54 Courts will not
adopt state law if it is inconsistent55 with the purposes underlying a
national problem,56 if there is a need for uniformity," or if the varia-
tion caused by the adoption of state law would subject the government
to uncertainty of its rights and duties.5"
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,5 9 the Supreme Court estab-
lished guidelines for determining when a court may incorporate state
law as the federal rule of decision. In Kimbell Foods, a private lienor
brought suit to foreclose on personal property in which the United
States also claimed an interest60 The Court established a three-prong
test to determine whether a court may incorporate state law.6 1 Under
this test, courts may incorporate state law if 1) it does not directly
conflict with the federal statute's objectives; 2) there is no federal inter-
est in uniformity; and 3) the state's interest in preventing the displace-
54. Field, Sources of Law: Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 883,
890 (1986). See, eg., U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land Co. Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 594-604
(1973); Georgia Power v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 936 (1981). See generally Comment, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of
Decision, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 825 (1976).
55. A federal court may incorporate non-conflicting state laws into the federal rule
if federal purposes underlying federal legislation will not be compromised. Field, supra
note 54, at 890-92.
56. In U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947), the Supreme
Court held that the federal government has exclusive authority to establish and define
its military policies. The Court found, however, in other circumstances when Congress
has failed to enact a comprehensive federal program it has implied its consent to the
application of consistent state law. Id. See also Powers v. U.S. Postal Service, 671 F.2d
1041 (7th Cir. 1982) (court applied state landlord tenant law where federal regulatory
scheme not affected); Merrill Tenant Council v. U.S. Dep't of HUD, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th
Cir. 1981) (incorporated state statute requiring the landlord to pay interest on tenants
security deposits); cf. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 317-32 (clean water act pre-
cludes federal common law public nuisance action because it comprehensively addresses
federal water pollution remedial scheme).
57. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4514 at 223-26 (1982). See also Field, supra note 54, at 881. A court may construct a
federal rule of decision when there is a need for national uniformity that outweighs the
need for state uniformity or when national interests are paramount. Id. at 962.
58. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 57. When the court incorporates state law into
federal common law the variation of its application among different states may lead to
uncertainty. Field, supra note 54, at 890.
59. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
60. Id. at 716-17. This was the result of a lien arising under a federal loan guarantee
program. Id.
61. Id. at 728-30.
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ment of its laws is substantial.62 In cases where national interest is
paramount, federal courts must formulate an independent federal com-
mon law rule. In other cases, courts may adopt applicable state laws as
the federal rule of decision as long as the state law does not conflict or
frustrate the objectives of federal policy.63
B. Housing Cases
In incorporating the implied warranty of habitability, courts must
find a gap in the federal statutory scheme and comply with Kimbell's
test. Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development 6
was the first case to confront whether the National Housing Act allows
incorporation of a state's implied warranty of habitability. In Alexan-
der, HUD terminated a deteriorated housing project rather than re-
store the property.65 Tenants brought suit seeking rent abatement on
the theory that HUD had breached an implied warranty of habitability
in renting substandard housing.66
The Alexander court declined to consider whether there was an im-
plied warranty of habitability as either an independent federal common
law rule or incorporated through state law as a federal rule of deci-
sion.67 Despite the trend in finding an implied warranty of habitability
in private residential leases, 68 the court found that an implied warranty
of habitability is tantamount to a guarantee that HUD is meeting the
62. See Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Sherred Village Assoc., 708 F.2d 804 (Ist
Cir. 1983) (the Kimbell factors applied to HUD mortgage lien results in incorporation
of state law).
63. Greig & Althoff, The Kimbell Decision: Applying State Laws as the Federal Rule
of Decision in Priority Disputes Between Federal Agency and State Private and Consen-
sual Liens, 86 CoM. L. J. 447 (1981). In Kimbell, the Court affirmed Clearfield in part
by upholding the application of federal rather than state law when a federal agency is
involved. The Court, however, modified Clearfield by reasoning that the need for uni-
formity was not sufficient to justify a uniform federal law as a federal rule of decision in
this case. Id. at 450.
64. 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977).
65. Id. at 168. Recognizing that the project had unsafe conditions, non-payment of
rents and that it would be costly to bring the project into acceptable condition, HUD
had notices to quit served on all tenants. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 171. The court was not persuaded that a warranty of habitability was
implied beyond the warranty that stated objectives of national policy have been met. Id.
68. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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goal of providing a "decent home and suitable living environment." '69
The court reasoned that the establishment of such a warranty is Con-
gress' responsibility.7° The court refused to interpret the "safe, decent
and sanitary" objectives as imposing an absolute fixed obligation on
HUD to maintain suitable housing.7 1 Instead the court explained that
these objectives should be accomplished over many years.72 By failing
to incorporate the implied warranty of habitability, the court tacitly
declined to create of federal common law in this area.7 3
After Alexander, Congress recognized that the Secretary was not
meeting the Act's requirement to provide a "decent home and suitable
living environment." 74 In response, Congress enacted the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1978, which more explicitly states the
national housing policy and maintenance standards.75 Every court
69. 555 F.2d at 171. The court did not consider whether placing an affirmative
contractual obligation upon HUD to repair and maintain low-income dwellings would
further the congressional goal of a safe, decent home for every family. The court
avoided the issue of how congressional goals could be most effectively implemented by
deferring to the possibility of future legislative action. Id. See Comment, Implied War-
ranty of Habitability in Federal Housing Projects: Alexander v. United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 19 B.C.L. REv. 355 (1978).
70. 555 F.2d at 171.
71. Id. Other courts have agreed with the Alexander court. See Perez v. U.S., 594
F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1979) (no absolute duty imposed on HUD to make all HUD-financed
public housing hazard free); Daniels v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 518 F.
Supp. 989 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Secretary has broad discretion in implementing the Na-
tional Housing Act).
72. 555 F.2d at 171.
73. Comment, supra note 69, at 350. Similar objections to the implication of a war-
ranty of habitability in public housing have been found in Perry v. Housing Auth., 664
F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981), and Federal Property Management v. Harris, 603 F.2d 1226
(6th Cir. 1979).
74. Congress noted this in enacting the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1978:
Section 209 C [1701z-I lc] would require that the Secretary of [HUD] maintain all
HUD-owned multifamily projects in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition. This
committee has received testimony that many projects have actually deteriorated
during period of HUD ownership and that HUD has been unresponsive in many
cases to the need for adequate maintenance of HUD owned properties.
S. REP No. 871, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4773, 4796.
75. These 1978 amendments stated more explicitly the Secretary's duty to maintain
his projects in decent safe and sanitary condition. The amendment requires:
(c) maintenance of housing projects
Except where the Secretary has determined on a case by case basis that it would
be clearly inappropriate, given the manner by which an individual project is to be
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since Alexander has found that these amendments impose a duty to
lease habitable housing by meeting minimum maintenance standards.7 6
However, these courts have yet to incorporate the state law warranty
to its full extent.
In Techer v. Roberts-Harris77 tenants of a low-income housing pro-
ject applied for rent abatement due to the project's unsanitary condi-
tions.7 8 HUD denied their application and instituted eviction
proceedings.79 The tenants filed suit seeking injunctive relief.80 After
expressly rejecting the holding in Alexander,81 the district court held
that it could incorporate state law in its federal rule of decision to the
extent that the implied warranty of habitability was consistent with the
National Housing Act. 2
In its federal common law analysis, the court considered the federal
housing policy goal to provide a decent home and suitable living envi-
ronment for every American family and emphasized congressional con-
cern over the failure to realize that goal. 3 The district court found
that public housing policy coincided with the adoption of the implied
managed or disposed of pursuant to subsection (a) of this section [1701z-1 l(a)] the
Secretary shall seek to-
1. Maintain all occupied multifamily housing projects owned by the Secretary
in a decent safe and sanitary condition...
12 U.S.C. § 1701z-lle.
76. See infra notes 73-121 and accompanying text for cases imposing minimum
maintenance standards on public housing.
77. 83 F.R.D. 124 (D. Conn. 1979).
78. Id. at 125. During HUD's control, vacant, garbage-filled units were adjacent to
occupied units. Plaintiffs claimed they had water leakage, plumbing failure, exposed
electrical wires, faulty heating, and rat and roach infestation. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 126. Plaintiff claimed that an implied warranty of habitability is incorpo-
rated in HUD leases under the NHA. Id.
81. Id. at 128. The court explained in a footnote that although Alexander had rec-
ognized that federal courts are free to shape federal common law rules by looking to
state court decisions and legislative history, it had declined to do so. Id.
82. Other courts have found an implied warranty. See Allen v. Housing Auth., 683
F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1982); Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552 (1lth Cir. 1986); Perez v. Boston
Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 400 14.E.2d 1231 (1980); Chase v. Theodore Mayer Bros.,
592 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (action filed on a building code issue was not barred
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Wilson v. Pierce, No. 81-264 (W.D. Pa. Au-
gust 11, 1982) (court found the implied warranty of habitability imposed on NHA
projects).
83. 83 F.R.D. at 129.
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warranty of habitability in a common law rule. 4 The court recognized
an inconsistency with Congressional policy by allowing HUD to "play
the role of slum lord by collecting rents without respect for tenants
living conditions." 5 The court recognized that the language of these
housing acts and policies was mandatory and not precatory.8 6 The
court recognized that a tenant's payment 7 of monthly rent without
obtaining decent housing is substantially more harmful than the mini-
mal effect upon HUD of forgoing rental income until it adequately re-
pairs the property. 8 The court awarded restitution of rent payments
made while the housing was not habitable as well as equitable relief
from payments due until the landlord made necessary repairs.8 9
In Mann v. Pierce,9° a tenant claimed damages for breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability in a federal housing project.91 In an ap-
peal based on a sovereign immunity defense to tenant's claim, the
Eleventh Circuit found that there was no bar to the suit.92 The court
also held that the state implied warranty of habitability's maintenance
requirements and consequential damages may be incorporated into the
federal law.9" Mann is the only case to find that the award of conse-
quential damages is consistent with the statutory provisions and policy
of the federal housing programs.
84. Id. at 130. The court distinguished Alexander in that here the plaintiff ought
injunctive relief and not a return of monies already paid to HUD. Id. at 128.
85. Techer v. Roberts-Harris (Techer II), No. N-78-484, slip op. at 5 (D. Conn.
Oct. 13, 1982) (as cited in Chase v. Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F. Supp. 90, 96 (S.D.
Ohio 1983)).
86. 83 F.R.D. at 129. See also U.S. v. Winthrop Towers, 628 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.
1980) (language of § 1701t is mandatory, not precatory).
87. 83 F.R.D. at 130. The court found the existence of an implied warranty of
habitability in HUD leases was consistent with NHA objectives as well as the reality of
the relationship between HUD and tenants. Id.
88. 83 F.R.D. at 130.
89. Techer, supra note 85.
90. 803 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1986).
91. Id. at 1554. Tenants claimed that HUD failed to maintain low-income housing
while it had been in HUD's possession and had not taken steps toward the removal of
carcinogenic asbestos. Id.
92. Id. at 1556-57.
93. Id. at 1558.
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V. CASE LAW INCORPORATING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY INTO
FEDERAL LAW
In the most recent case on the issue, the First Circuit found the im-
plied warranty could be incorporated into federal law, but limited the
extent of this incorporation by excluding consequential damages. In
Conille v. Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment 94 a deteriorated HUD-subsidized apartment forced the tenant to
vacate." The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Secretary had
breached an implied warranty of habitability.96 The plaintiff sought to
recover rent and compensatory damages for the period stemming from
the beginning of HUD management of the building until the plaintiff
vacated.97
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's state law claims on the
ground that they conflicted with the National Housing Act.98 The
First Circuit reversed. 99 Although the court declined to incorporate
state landlord-tenant law in its entirety, 1°° it held as a matter of federal
common law that the state law warranty of habitability could be en-
forced insofar as it is consistent with the National Housing Act.''
The court awarded the plaintiff restitution of rental payments made
during the period in which HUD failed to maintain housing.' 2
The First Circuit upheld the principle that courts may incorporate
state law as the federal rule of decision in cases involving federal con-
tractual obligations' 3 where Congress has not addressed the issue and
94. 840 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
95. Id. at 108. The City of Boston Housing Inspection Department had prepared a
complaint concerning the poor repair of the plaintiff's ceilings, walls and defective win-
dows. The report found the premises needed a new stove and refrigerator and were
infested with mice and cockroaches. Id.
96. Id. at 108 n.1. HUD asserted that federal law must be applied and that Con-
gress has comprehensively addressed the issues and left no room for federal courts to
fashion federal common law in this area. Id. at 109.
97. Id. at 108.
98. Conille v. Pierce, 649 F. Supp. 1133, 1154 (D. Mass. 1986). The district court
concluded that even if the Secretary had breached a duty to maintain the premises, the
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover either monetary damages or restitution of rent
because either remedy would be too extraordinary for this case. Id.
99. 840 F.2d at 117.
100. Id. at 114.
101. Id. at 117.
102. Id.
103. The court expressly disagreed with Alexander's argument that a warranty in
public housing is a guarantee that the national housing goals are being met. 840 F.2d at
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state law resolves it without conflicting with federal policy. " The
court concluded that it must establish a federal common law rule be-
cause the case did not present a situation where Congress has compre-
hensively occupied the field.105
In its federal common law analysis, the court considered the degree
of conflict in Conille and reaffirmed that the statutory maintenance ob-
ligation imposed upon HUD was narrower than that imposed upon
private landlords."' 6 The court found that while there are specific lim-
itations on HUD's maintenance obligations,"°7 the NHA does not ar-
ticulate standards for landlord-tenant relations in HUD properties." 8
The court held"° that Congress only intended to require the Secretary
to take reasonable steps toward maintaining low-income housing
projects. 1 The court noted that Massachusetts' requirement that
landlords must take affirmative action in building maintenance was
more stringent than the federal statute's.11 The Conille court con-
cluded that incorporating the more stringent state law in its entirety
would frustrate the NHA's limited maintenance obligation.112
The court also found that state law was inconsistent with the NRA
116 n.15. Instead, the court expanded the federal common law analysis in Techer by
establishing procedural guidelines for showing a breach and standards for what is "de-
cent, safe and sanitary housing." Id. at 117.
104. Id. at 110.
105. Id. at 111-12.
106. Id. at 113.
107. The court disagreed with Alexander's finding that the only implied contractual
obligation is that federal housing goals are being met. Id. at 116 n.15.
108. Id. at 111. The relevant statutory language reads:
The NHA provides maintenance obligations...
(c) except where the Secretary has determined on a case-by-case basis that it
would be clearly inappropriate, the Secretary shall seek to:
(1) maintain all... housing projects... in a decent, safe and sanitary condi-
tion; and
(2) to the greatest extent possible, maintain full occupancy in all multi-family
housing projects ....
12 U.S.C. § 1701.
109. The court considered Kimbell's requirements for consistency with federal pol-
icy and statutory language. 840 F.2d at 112.
110. Id. at 112. The court noted that the choice of the words "shall seek" rather
than "shall" indicates more limited liability than under state landlord-tenant law where
affirmative steps of private landlords toward meeting their obligations would not pre-
vent liability. Id.
112. Id. at 113.
112. Id.
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insofar as it allowed a tenant to recover consequential damages from a
landlord who interfered with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the prem-
ises. 113 The court noted that the imposition of consequential damages
would potentially interfere with the NHA's goal of upgrading housing
by exposing the federal government to unpredictable costs. 114 How-
ever, the court recognized that, despite its conflicts, state law must be
the starting point in fashioning a federal rule in light of the strong state
interest in regulating landlord-tenant relations.11 5
The First Circuit then considered the extent to which the implied
warranty coincided with the NHA, and thus could be adopted.1 1 6 The
court clearly defined the procedure for establishing a breach by apply-
ing the federal common law analytical framework. The court held that
if, while on notice of the conditions of the property, the Secretary failed
to make the necessary repairs to the premises, the tenant could estab-
lish a breach. 7 Once the plaintiff established a breach she would be
entitled to the difference between the value of the premises in a decent,
safe and sanitary condition and the value of the premises in their dete-
riorated condition. 8 State and local housing standards provide the
criteria for what is a decent, safe and sanitary condition.119 The court
also noted that injunctive relief would be insufficient as it would leave
tenants in defective housing with no recourse.1 20 Instead the tenant
could obtain rent restitution to compensate for inadequate housing and
to provide some assurance and incentive that HUD will fulfill its main-
tenance obligation.121
VI. ANALYSIS
The Conille court found only parts of the Massachusetts implied
113. Id. at 113-14.
114. Id. at 114. Judge Coffin noted that consequential damages would frustrate
Congress's allocation of financial resources that are necessary for the improvement of
the nation's housing stock. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 117.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court noted that as soon as a tenant filed for injunctive relief the Secre-
tary could avoid his obligation to respond by making his "clearly appropriate" finding
and tenants would remain in defective housing without relief. Id.
121. Id.
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warranty of habitability law consistent with the NHA. Nevertheless,
the First Circuit was the first court to go through the federal common
law analysis and apply it to specific provisions under state law. The
holding in Conille clearly defines how far courts may apply the state
implied warranty law to public housing tenants.12 2 The First Circuit's
application of a notice requirement and state and local housing stan-
dards filled a wide gap in the federal legislation. The court's rule, how-
ever, only incorporated the tenant's remedy of rent restitution.123
Although the court noted that injunctive relief would not be suffi-
ciently compensatory,"' it could have followed Mann v. Pierce "' and
allowed for incorporation of the full extent of damages that are pro-
vided under state law.1 26 Without actual and consequential damages
there is inadequate incentive for HUD to improve the conditions of
public housing when they deteriorate.
Although the Conile court mentioned the Kimbell Foods test in a
footnote, 12 7 if it had more thoroughly adhered to the three prong
test' 21 it would have found less of a conflict between state and federal
law and incorporated the consequential damages provision. First,
adopting state law's affirmative maintenance obligation and conse-
quential damages does not conflict with objectives of providing safe,
decent and sanitary housing. Rather, requiring owners of HUD-subsi-
dized properties to meet the local housing codes is inconsistent because
when HUD is the landlord the Secretary does not have to comply. 129
The Secretary is one of the largest single landlords in the nation. Such
leniency would undermine the policy goals of federal housing.1 30
122. "'[I]f there is no significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
and the use of state law, there is no need for a federal court to embark upon the unfamil-
iar road of common law-making even in situations where the rights or obligations of the
United States are at stake." Id. at 110 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313
(1981)). See also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
123. 890 F.2d at 117.
124. Id. The court noted that the Secretary's maintenance requirements under 12
U.S.C. § 1701z-11(c) would be meaningless if the only remedy available to tenants was
injunctive relief. Id.
125. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mann v.
Pierce.
126. Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986).
127. 840 F.2d at 112 n.11.
128. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text for discussion of the Kimbell
Foods test.
129. Chase v. Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F. Supp. 90, 101 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
130. "The establishment of federally immunized slums disrupts tenants rights for
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HUD typically argues that the "case by case" exception where mainte-
nance is "clearly inappropriate" suggests a more lenient maintenance
requirement and implies that the imposition of consequential damages
would be inconsistent.13 1 However, Congress' allowance for the Secre-
tary's "case by case" discretion may indicate that where repairing the
premises is appropriate, HUD should be liable under state law for its
failure to do so. Further, although the Conille court held that the
"case by case" exception is an irreconcilable conflict with state law,1 32
the court did not identify that conflict.
Second, there is no federal interest in uniformity. There is a particu-
larly strong argument for application of state law in its entirety in light
of the tradition of state regulation of real property.1 33 In considering
the need for uniformity, the court must weigh HUD's interest in a uni-
form statutory scheme against federal policy interests. 134 Courts can-
not reject state and local regulations merely because they differ among
jurisdictions.' 35 The court's fear of "unpredictable costs" that conse-
quential damages may impose on the government can be allayed if the
court imposes a limit to the amount the tenant may recover. Even a
limited remedy would be better than solely allowing reimbursement of
rent.
Finally, under the third prong of Kimbell, the court should recog-
nize that property law traditionally has been within the domain of the
states. The state has a substantial interest in the application of its im-
plied warranty of habitability.' 36 The policy reasons for ensuring de-
cent housing for tenants, expressed in Javins, apply equally to private
and public landlords.137 Perhaps there is even more inequality in bar-
decent and sanitary conditions is in conflict with the guarantee of habitable housing for
all its residents regardless of the landlord's identity." Brief for Appellant at 38, Conille
v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. 840 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
131. 840 F.2d at 112.
132. Id.
133. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1972) (no justification to federalize
landlord-tenant relations); Powers v. U. S. Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir.
1982) (incorporation of state law to govern leases with Post Office).
134. Chase v. Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F. Supp. 90, 98 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
135. Id.
136. In Powers, 671 F.2d at 1043, the court concluded that the incorporation of
state law as a federal rule of decision "is a frequent choice especially in real property law
of which landlord-tenant law is a part." See also U.S. v. Little Misere Land Co, 412
U.S. at 580, 591 (1973) (the great body of law in this country which defines the rights of
property owners is found in the statutes and decisions of the states).
137. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (1970).
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gaining power among low-income tenants and thus more reason to ex-
tend the warranty to public housing. 138 The court incorrectly assumed
that the incorporation of rent restitution would assure a minimum
housing standard consistent with the state's interest. In some cases the
cost of the repairs required to merely bring the housing up to a mini-
mum standard is so great that rent restitution and abatement may be
more cost efficient than maintenance. In these cases the threat of liabil-
ity for consequential damages would be the only adequate protection
for tenants and the only way to ensure enforcement of the congres-
sional intent to provide safe housing.
In future cases, courts should first establish that there is a gap in the
federal housing legislation and that it is appropriate to incorporate
state law as the federal rule of decision. The court then should con-
sider the Kimbell factors of conflict, the need for uniformity and the
state's interest in preventing the displacement of its law. In consider-
ing these factors, the court should balance them with the federal policy
of providing a decent, safe and sanitary place to live. The legislative
purpose should weigh heavily in the balance.
If courts give this policy its proper weight, it is unlikely they will find
that an affirmative maintenance obligation or consequential damages
frustrates the provisions of the federal statute. Even if courts find un-
limited consequential damages is inappropriate, they should use their
discretion and limit the amount the plaintiff can recover. This would
avoid subjecting the government to the "unpredictable costs" courts
have feared.' 39 There are circumstances where a public housing tenant
suffers substantial loss other than the rent paid during the period of
breach. The tenant should at least be able to recover moving costs,
damage to personal property, and medical expenses for treatment of
vermin bites.
The optimum solution is for Congress to amend its housing acts and
specifically provide its own maintenance requirements and remedies for
a breach. In the meantime, tenants must rely on case law to determine
their rights. While Conille made great advances by articulating low-
income housing tenants' interests, without the incorporation of conse-
quential damages into the federal rule of decision, HUD may not be
138. Id. at 1079. Various impediments to competition in the rental market such as
racial and class discrimination mean that landlords place tenants in a take it or leave it
situation. Id.
139. Conille v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 840 F.2d 105, 117 (1st Cir.
1988).
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adequately protecting lower-income public housing tenant's interests.
The failure to protect these tenants from substandard housing is incon-
sistent with public housing policy.
Rachel Camber*
* J.D. 1990, Washington University
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